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In the absence of an overarching strategy, Turkey and the Palestinian territories depict how the 
EU has adopted different approaches to security sector reform (SSR) which have not facilitated 
the consolidation of a common EU foreign policy, though the situation might soon change given 
respective SSR-related documents from the Council and Commission. This report contributes 
to the security sector debate by stressing that in conflict and post-conflict scenarios endurable 
SSR requires fomenting synergies between the police and judicial sectors and the inclusion 
of DDR, in tandem with the institutional implementation of transparent, accountable and 
democratic oversight mechanisms. There is an adamant need for constructive consistency 
when applying this central facet of EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean basin and beyond.
SSR is an emerging phenomenon in conflict, post-conflict and development scenarios that has 
acquired a prominent role within the policy agendas of key international actors. As a prelude to 
the two case studies, and in order to better understand the EU’s end goal, a brief analysis of the 
two pivotal European SSR documents is provided with particular emphasis on their contribution 
to develop a more coherent and effective EU presence in this field. More specific consideration 
is then given to the role played by SSR-related matters within the framework of two EU foreign 
policy mechanisms towards the Mediterranean: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 
also known as the Barcelona Process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
The two case studies - Turkey and the Palestinian territories - are exceptional due to the 
nature of their geopolitical position in regional and international politics. Both demonstrate 
different levels of state development and different degrees of monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force, which have contributed to the development of different EU approaches to SSR, 
tailored to the specific needs of the local context in which the Union is operating. Both 
cases also demonstrate how the EU emphasizes democracy or security depending on the 
respective circumstantial differences. Turkey exemplifies by and large the EU accession 
process of fulfilling democratic reform in return for EU membership. The Palestinian case 
illustrates how security demands precede democratic apertures. Together, both highlight 
the lack of a consistent and comprehensive EU SSR strategy, the lack of which continues to 
impede the emergence of a common EU foreign policy.
This study makes a set of recommendations for the two case studies, and concludes with 
more general ones applicable to the broader Euro-Mediterranean area. These are mainly 
addressed to the European Commission, Council of the EU (and thus, Member States) 
and European Parliament. Moreover, the conclusions and recommendations included in 
this report could inspire the work of various advocacy groups in the fields of SSR, conflict 
resolution and democracy and human rights promotion given that, based on the “human 
security” logic, this report departs from the assumption that police reform encapsulates 
both modernising and democratising processes. 
Security sector reform (SSR) is a recent concept, born and developed in the late 1990s with 
a “visionary integration” role.1 Heavily influenced by the “human security” discourse, SSR 
represents the idea that security and development are two faces of the same coin. According 
to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD DAC), “Inappropriate security structures and mechanisms 
can contribute to weak governance and to instability and violent conflict, which impact 
negatively on poverty reduction”.2 
A central component of SSR is police reform. From a good governance perspective, police 
reform is important to foster peaceful and democratic societal environments that provide 
the appropriate context for economic growth and basic security.3 Police reform is primordial 
to the consolidation of official state structures and instrumental to the implementation of 
legitimate state monopoly over the use of force. Proper police reform requires going beyond 
modernisation efforts (technical assistance, cooperation and efficiency) to include the 
democratisation needs of this institution (civilian, parliamentary, judicial and public control 
and oversight).4 Consequently, within the EU’s commitment to foster peace and stability in 
a variety of contexts and as a measure to ensure its own security, police assistance is and 
will constitute an important implementing tool. 
A more concrete reason for focusing on the police dimension is that the approaches developed 
by the EU towards the two case studies clearly depict the different challenges confronting 
the Union when struggling to define a coherent SSR strategy in the Mediterranean basin.5 
This report does not attempt to draw lessons from the Turkish and Palestinian police reform 
processes per	se, but rather from the manner (and resulting repercussions) in which EU 
instruments have been implemented in two different scenarios. 
1.
Executive 
Summary
2.
Introduction 
1 Herbert �ulf, “Security Sector Reform in Developing        
and Transitional Countries”, in Clem McCartney, Marti-
na Fischer and Oliver �ils (eds.), Security	Sector	Reform	
-	Potentials	and	Challenges	for	Conflict	Transformation, 
Dialogue Series, Berlin: Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management, 2004, p. 10.
2 OECD DAC,   Security	System	Reform	and	Governance, 
Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris, 2005, p. 11. For 
a detailed analysis of the human security concept and 
its relation to SSR, see Commission on Human Secu-
rity, Human	Security	Now, New York: United Nations 
Publications, 2003; and David Law, “Human Security 
and Security Sector Reform: Contrasts and Common-
alities”, Sicherheit	und	Frieden, Nº 1, 2005, pp. 14-20.
3 This report refers to “police” as public agencies and          
state institutions with a security mandate within the 
borders of an administrative state area. It does not in-
clude “policing”, which in the literature on police stud-
ies also refers to private security companies, citizen-
based agencies and new surveillance technologies.  
4 This report builds on a previous project on the          
democratic and civilian control of armed forces (DC-
CAF) within SSR processes in Spain and Turkey, see 
Eduard Soler i Lecha, Débora Miralles i Solé, Ümit 
Cizre and Volkan Aytar, Drawing	Lessons	from	Turkey’s	
and	Spain’s	Security	Sector	Reforms	for	the	Mediter-
ranean, EuroMeSCo Research Report,	Nº 52, Lisbon, 
October 2006.
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There are two EU documents on SSR, the 2005 EU	Concept	for	ESDP	Support	to	Security	
Sector	 Reform and the 2006	 A	 Concept	 for	 European	Community	 Support	 for	 Security	
Sector	Reform, which were brought together under a common policy framework in 2006.6 
These two SSR concepts build on various EU reference documents and a range of Council, 
Commission and Member States’ activities in various geographical and thematic areas 
that some analysts would argue have been re-labelled to fall under SSR. The EU is not 
new to this field, but it lacks effective integration of its policies into a comprehensive, 
overarching strategy. This is what the two EU SSR documents aspire to do by providing 
“one common understanding on SSR among the 27 Member States”.7 
The EU adopts by and large the OECD DAC extensive definition of the security sector that 
includes from core security actors to security management and oversight bodies, justice 
and law enforcement institutions and non-statutory security forces (with whom donors 
rarely engage).8 This endorsement of the OECD guidelines is further exemplified by the 
importance placed in both the Council and Commission SSR documents on ensuring and 
strengthening the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector when 
dealing with external and internal security needs; the civilian control of security actors; 
and the protection of democratic norms and principles of good governance, human 
rights, transparency and the rule of law. This is to be achieved on the basis of a holistic, 
multi-sectoral approach that seeks to find linkages between existing local security 
actors, rather that concentrating on one, often independent of other associated security 
actors’ reform processes, as previous donor actions have tended to do.9 These pledges 
are grounded on a search for local ownership and tailored reforms that can ensure that 
EU support to SSR is most adequately applied to the needs of the local population, the 
country and region in question. 
This commitment to more coherent and effective EU engagement in SSR activities is 
still in its early implementation stages and therefore, it is difficult to assess its long-
term relevance. The Council and Commission documents (and the subsequent policy 
framework) clearly represent a major step forward in developing the EU’s external 
identity. The strategy described in these documents will allow the Union to respond more 
effectively to a variety of challenges, including violent conflict, poverty, state fragility 
and terrorism. The EU possesses the right variety of tools and mechanisms as well as 
respect for being a long-standing active donor, to make a positive impact in this field. 
However, in order to attain tangible results and take advantage of its strengths, the EU 
needs to continue working on solutions to a number of issues, ranging from planning and 
budgeting to taking into account the costly political, economic and human implications 
of an integrated SSR strategy, to building effective relations (at headquarters and field 
levels) among members of the EU family and externally with a variety of actors so as 
to create cooperation rather than competition.10 The problems encountered during the 
policy formulation phase are a clear illustration of the importance of these outstanding 
issues.11 
The EU’s Mediterranean Policy exemplifies the challenges facing the Union as it tries 
to become a significant actor in the field of SSR. Although the Barcelona Process has 
included democratisation and promotion of good governance as major goals, SSR has 
never been a priority for EU policies towards the Mediterranean.12 Most documents of 
the Barcelona Process, from the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 to the five-year working 
programme agreed at the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean summit in 2005, do not contain 
a single reference to SSR.13 In the few cases in which the Barcelona Process does tackle 
police-related issues, it has focused on the need to increase cooperation between police 
units in order to fight illegal migration, terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime, 
leaving democratic aspects of the reform process out of the agenda. 
This situation contrasts with five contemporary realities: (1) the increasing importance 
played by SSR in the policies of the EU towards other regions, particularly in the �estern 
Balkans and Africa;14 (2) the increasing weight assigned to SSR-related issues in the 
intra-Arab discussions on political reform;15 (3) the existence of MEDA regulations which 
aim at developing “co-operation in areas relating to the rule of law, such as co-operation 
in judicial and criminal matters, the strengthening of institutions which guarantee the 
independence and effectiveness of the judicial system, the training of national security 
services and civil protection”;16 (4) the EU’s concerns over the situation of partners on 
matters such as arrests and imprisonments without due process and unsatisfactory 
treatment of prisoners, and extra-judicial killings by the authorities;17 and (5) the 
increasing importance of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the EMP, particularly since 
Valencia’s 2002 Euro-Mediterranean Conference and, above all, the inclusion of a JHA 
chapter in the five-year working programme adopted in the Barcelona summit in 2005. 
5 This report considers “strategy” as a framework of         
institutional mechanisms at the disposal of the EU 
to create policies, both in the socio-economic and 
politico-security spheres. This definition moves away 
from the strictly classical or militaristic understand-
ing of strategy as “a plan of action that calculates 
the relationship of specific means to larger ends” or 
“the art of distributing and applying military means 
to fulfil the ends of policy” (Liddell Hart, 1991). The 
definition adopted in this report emphasises the need 
for common goals that use the strengths of different 
institutions and ensure coherence between short 
and long-term needs, priorities and interventions. It 
is important to note that SSR-related EU documents 
refer to this understanding of “strategy” as compre-
hensive, cross-pillar, well-coordinated “responses” or 
“approach/es”. In order to better separate the past 
and present from what the EU is aspiring to develop, 
this report prefers to use “approach” and “strategy” 
respectively. Ursula Schröeder, “Strategy by Stealth? 
EU Security Policies between Crisis Management and 
External Security Governance”, in European	 Conflict	
Prevention	 and	 Crisis	 Management	 Policies,	 Final 
Conference, Brussels, 5-6 July 2007, p. 5; and Damian 
Helly, “Developing an EU Strategy for Security Sector 
Reform”, European	Security	Review,	Nº 28, February 
2006, p. 8.
6 For a longer analysis of these two documents, see          
Gemma Collantes Celador, “The EU and its Policy to-
wards Security Sector Reform: a New Example of the 
‘Conceptual-Contextual’ Divide?”, in 6th	 International	
Seminar	 on Security	 and	 Defence	 in	 the	 Mediterra-
nean, Barcelona: CIDOB and Spanish Ministry of De-
fence, forthcoming.
7 Interview with Council official, Brussels, April 2007.       
8 Council of the EU,     EU	Concept	for	ESDP	Support	to	Se-
curity	Sector	Reform	(SSR), Document Nº 12566/4/05 
REV 4, Brussels, 13 October 2005, pp. 5, 7-8.
9 In this respect, the integration of DDR activities with-         
in a SSR context, as called for in the EU 2006 docu-
ment, is a step in the right direction. Council of the EU 
and European Commission, EU	 Concept	 for	 Support	
to	 Disarmament,	 Demobilisation	 and	 Reintegration	
(DDR), Document Nº 16387/06, Brussels, Approved by 
the Council of the EU on 11 December 2006 and by the 
European Commission on 14 December 2006, p. 12.
10 For examples of possible solutions on the table         
see Council of the EU and European Commission, 
Joint	Council	Secretariat	–	Commission	Services	Work-
ing	 Paper	 on	 Security	 and	 Development	 –	 Food	 for	
Thought	to	Strengthen	EU	Policy	Coherence, Brussels, 
2 October 2007, pp. 3-5.
11 See Collantes Celador, “The EU and its Policy to-         
wards Security Sector Reform”, op. cit.
12 Launched in 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-      
ship (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, has 
faced substantial difficulties since its initial stages, but 
remains the main regional cooperation framework for 
states and citizens around the Mediterranean basin.
13 Council of the EU,     Five	Year	Work	Programme,	10th	
Anniversary	 Euro-Mediterranean	 Summit,	 Barcelona, 
Document Nº 15074/05 (Presse 327), Brussels, 27-28 
November 2005.
14 Interviews with Council and Commission officials,       
Brussels, April 2007. Africa seems to have been in the 
mind of Council and Commission officials involved in 
the drafting process of the two SSR documents for a 
number of reasons, but this does not mean that the 
two concepts were created for implementation in 
this continent alone. On the contrary, the intention 
was to create a general tool that the EU could use in 
a variety of contexts worldwide, as illustrated by the 
various scenarios for action identified in the two SSR 
documents.
15 Arnold Luethold, “Security Sector Reform in the Mid-        
dle East: A Nascent Debate”, in Alan Bryden and Heiner 
Hänggi (eds.), Reform	and	Reconstruction	of	the	Secu-
rity	Sector, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004, Chapter 5.
16 European Commission,  	 Communication	 from	 the	
Commission	 to	 the	Council	 and	 the	European	Parlia-
ment,	Reinvigorating	EU	actions	on	Human	Rights	and	
Democratisation	with	Mediterranean	Partners,	Strate-
gic	 Guidelines, Document Nº COM (2003) 294 final, 
Brussels, 21 May 2003.
17 European Commission,   Communication	 from	 the	
Commission	to	the	Council	and	the	European	Parliament	
to	Prepare	the	Meeting	of	Euro-Mediterranean	Foreign	
Ministers, Valencia,	22-23	April	2002, Document Nº SEC 
(2002) 159 final, Brussels, 13 February 2002,  p. 5.
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In February 2004, a regional programme entitled Euro-Med	Police	Cooperation	Project	in	
the	MEDA	Region was launched for two years, which aimed to improve cooperation among 
the police forces of Mediterranean partners in the areas of organised crime, human- and 
narcotics-trafficking, international terrorism, human rights and illegal immigration. These 
aims were to be achieved by: (a) the organisation of seminars, which included targeted 
training, specialised debate forums and visits to relevant EU and MEDA country agencies 
dealing with the different project areas; (b) the organisation of a network of specialised 
police officers and trainers to promote exchanges of information and best practice in the 
Mediterranean region; and (c) the creation of specific teaching material on the different 
project areas. Scarce information exists regarding the development and outcomes of 
this project, which the European Commission considers extremely sensitive. These types 
of programmes, however, have sidelined the democratic reform dimension to prioritise 
other elements such as exchanges of information, confidence-building, socialisation and 
networking among different police bodies.18 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework could be a more appropriate 
mechanism to foster police reform and other related political reform processes. The 
gradualist, pragmatic and strictly bilateral approach of the ENP could allow the EU to work 
together with those countries willing to pursue a reform strategy in the police and other 
security actors. Country reports and action plans corresponding to Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean partners have neglected police reform, in terms of both the modernisation 
and democratisation dimensions. In the very few exceptions, such as the references to 
torture and police abuse in Egypt’s country report, the EU has failed to translate them into 
concrete recommendations in the adopted action plans.19 
This study concentrates on two cases that counter this diagnosis. In Turkey, as a member 
of the Barcelona Process, but not a beneficiary of the ENP due to possible accession as a 
candidate country, the EU has addressed SSR including police reform. And in the Palestinian 
territories, as founding member of the Barcelona Process and active partner in the ENP, and 
as reflected in the country reports and action plans devoted to the Palestinian Authority, 
the EU has actively promoted SSR, particularly within the ESDP framework. These two 
cases exemplify existing scenarios which provide concrete challenges to the EU in the 
Mediterranean region as it struggles to improve its role in the domain of SSR. 
As an integral element of SSR, police reform is a new concept in Turkey. It is not usually 
referred to directly in laws, regulations, executive orders and other administrative practices. 
This may have to do partly with the negative resonance that the concept of “reform” has 
in the Turkish administrative working vocabulary, based on the mentality that a structure 
or practice in need of reform implies recognition of failures or deficiencies. Despite the 
longitudinal impact of the top-down and authoritarian state practices and associated laws 
and regulations, attempts similar to reform have been emerging especially since Turkey’s 
EU-orientation from the late 1990s. To situate these attempts, the particular context driving 
reform as well as internal security mechanisms and structures in Turkey needs clarification.
Although some shy steps were initiated in early 1992 by the then reformist government, 
especially with the amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK), the need to 
reform the internal security forces became even more apparent particularly with Turkey’s 
European Union accession process since the late 1990s.20 In the context of Turkey’s 
harmonization measures, the EU-led drive seems to be the main determinant behind police 
reform attempts. Internal mechanisms have remained rather weak comparatively, while the 
military character of the gendarmerie was voiced more within the context of Turkey’s civil-
military relations (CMR), that seemed to diverge from the accepted EU standards, the human 
rights and professionalism record of the police force were among the perceived reasons for 
the need to reform. However, for both agencies problems associated with professionalism 
and accountability also seem to be among the main reasons for reform. Motivation for EU 
membership has been the key source for changes in this field as well.
However, in the context of Turkey’s successive EU Harmonization Packages – the legislative 
bundles of legal reform carried out between 2002 and 2005 (following the important 
constitutional amendment in 2001) – a holistic police reform (or, even more generally, internal 
security sector reform) was still not clearly delineated. Instead, most of the draconian laws 
and regulations were liberalized and the space for individual rights and freedoms was 
expanded, and some beginning steps towards civilian supremacy and oversight over the 
3. 
Turkey:
Promises
and Challenges
3.1.
The Need for Reform: 
EU-led Drive
18 Information based on interviews with EU officials,        
Brussels, April 2007.
19 European Commission,   Commission	Staff	Working	
Paper	 Annex	 to	 “European	 Neighbourhood	 Policy”	
Country	 Report	 Egypt,	 {COM	 (2005)	 72	 final}, Docu-
ment Nº SEC (2005) 287/3, Brussels, 2 March 2005.
20 In the mid-1990s, the Turkish Police Academy ini-        
tiated a new approach to prepare the national police 
department for Turkey’s EU orientation. In 1996, the 
Academy organized a conference on the impact of the 
EU process on the police. See Turkish Police Acad-
emy, Türk	 Polisinin	 AB	 Sürecine	 Etkisi	 Sempozyumu	
Bildirgeleri	 (Symposium Proceedings of “The Turkish 
Police’s Influence on the EU Process”), Polis Akad-
emisi Yayınları, Ankara, 1996.
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security forces were initiated. Some of those changes could still be seen in the light of 
police reform, at least in their potential practical outcomes. European Commission-assisted 
“twinning”21 and related projects (with all the deficiencies and problems to be discussed 
below) could be evaluated more closely within a police reform approach.
The EU’s role in Turkey’s police reform should be situated within the accession/enlargement 
process whereby the EU contributed and assisted to institution-building in the policing 
sector (including police and gendarmerie agencies), through programmes such as twinning 
and others, as Turkey strove to adopt, enforce and execute the acquis	 communautaire. 
The EU’s strategies were mainly formulated, customized and implemented through the 
European Commission (EC)’s Delegation to Turkey in Ankara, the national capital. The 
Commission document describes SSR for candidate countries as follows: 
The reform of the security sector in candidate or potential candidate countries is partly 
covered under the political Copenhagen criteria (guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, respect and protection of minorities) for EU membership. The 
prospect of EU membership also carries with it a series of very specific obligations 
in the areas of border controls, migration, asylum and visa, police cooperation, or 
judicial co-operation in criminal or civil matters, which falls under the EU	policy	of	
freedom,	security	and	 justice.	Fulfilling membership requirements in these areas 
is not only about transposing in national legislation the related EU acquis under 
Chapter 24 of accession negotiations. The countries must also demonstrate their 
capacity to successfully implement this acquis, and more generally align the rest of 
the related legislation and practice of their services in line with commonly accepted 
EU standards and best practices.22
To move towards this goal, the EC Delegation has worked closely with the Turkish Ministry 
of Interior to develop manageable projects designed to help the police and gendarmerie. 
The EC has also cooperated with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to 
advance efforts to institute civilian capacity-building and civilian oversight mechanisms of 
internal security sector agencies. In helping Turkey “align the rest of [its] related legislation 
and practice of services in line with commonly accepted EU standards and best practices,”23 
the EC’s approach to police reform should normally be seen as part and parcel of the EU’s 
larger orientation towards assisting security sector reform as a whole. However, before we 
discuss the reform process and EU’s role in it, let us briefly discuss the basic parameters of 
Turkish internal security organization. 
Since at least the late Ottoman period, the internal security forces were organized along a 
two-fold structure: the civilian police force and the gendarmerie with its military structure. 
According to their official histories, both forces emanate from the mid-nineteenth century 
formation of the	 Zaptiye	Müşirliği (‘field marshalship’ in charge of law enforcement).24 
However, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the bifurcation of these 
two forces, which served both as “social control” and “law enforcement” mechanisms,25 
became more apparent when the republican law administering the gendarmerie corps went 
into effect in 1930.26
The national police force and the gendarmerie are differentiated along two important lines, 
firstly in terms of their respective jurisdictions; secondly, in terms of responsibilities vis-à-
vis the civilian government authorities. The police’s jurisdiction roughly consists of urban 
areas and the gendarmerie provides security in rural areas. This geographical distinction 
became increasingly at odds with the social realities created by the rapid urbanization of 
Turkey.27 This dual situation reportedly creates problems concerning the division of labour, 
coordination and jurisdiction and accountability of security services.
�hile legally, both the police (the General Directorate of Security, EGM) and the 
gendarmerie are responsible to the Ministry of Interior (İB), the gendarmerie’s military 
nature (represented by the General Command of Gendarmerie, JGK) seems to create 
confusion with its responsibilities to the civilian authorities. Although the Law on the 
Establishment, Duties and Jurisdiction of Gendarmerie28 placed the gendarmerie under 
the [provincial] governors and district governors appointed by the İB, the JGK is squarely 
situated within the four-fold hierarchical structure of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Also 
in terms of promotions, appointments, personnel administration, disciplinary and judiciary 
procedures, the gendarmerie corps is located within the military structure headed by the 
Office of the Chief of General Staff, who, in turn, responds to the Office of the Prime Minister, 
instead of to the Ministry of National Defence (MSB).29
3.2. 
Socio-Political Context: 
Police and Gendarmerie 
in Turkey - A Bifurcated 
Structure
21 “Twinning” is an initiative of the European Commis-        
sion, designed to assist candidate countries (often state 
administrations) in acquiring the independent capacity 
to adopt, implement and enforce the full acquis	commu-
nautaire	before accession to the European Union.
22 European Commission, “Annexes to the Communica-      
tion from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament” in	A	Concept	for	European	Community	
Support	for	Security	Sector	Reform,	Document Nº COM 
(2006) 253 final, Brussels, 25 May 2006, p. 4.
23 Ibid. 
24 �hile some ambiguities exist, especially in terms of         
the exact formation date of the corps, the official history of 
the Turkish Gendarmerie can be accessed at http://www.
jandarma.tsk.mil.tr/redirect.htm?url=/genel/tarihceic.
htm. For the official history of the Turkish National Police, 
see http://www.egm.gov.tr/tar.osmanli1879-1908.asp.   
25 For the transformation of the Turkish National Police         
in terms of its “social control” function, see, Ferdan Ergut, 
Modern	 Devlet	 ve	 Polis:	 Osmanlı’dan	 Cumhuriyete	 To-
plumsal	Denetim	Diyalektiği	(Modern	State	and	the	Police:	
Social	Control	Dialectics	from	the	Ottoman	Empire	to	the	Re-
public), Istanbul: Iletisim Publications, 2004. For an account 
of the National Police Department (Directorate General of 
Security – Emniyet	Genel	Müdürlüğü,	EGM), see İbrahim 
Cerrah, “Police”, in Ümit Cizre (ed.), Almanac	Turkey	2005:	
Security	Sector	and	Democratic	Oversight, Istanbul: TESEV 
Publications, 2005, pp. 86-99. Full PDF text accessible at 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/almanaking.pdf.   
26 Law Nº 1706, 10 June 1930.      
27 For examples of the controversy over the respective         
“zones of duty” of the police and gendarmerie, see 
Cerrah, “Police”, op. cit., p. 105.
28 Law Nº 2803, 10 March 1983.      
29 See Lale Sarıibrahimo   ğlu, “Gendarmerie”, in Cizre, 
Almanac	Turkey	2005, op. cit., pp. 100-111.
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Indeed, until today, the JGK has retained its military character (to evidence its importance 
as part and parcel of the military and civilian bureaucracy, or the “state” – devlet), while 
the EGM was seen as a more “politicised” entity supposedly open to political influence 
and ideological infiltrations by, among others, the civilian “government” – hükûmet). This 
important duality between the state and the government forms one of the main problems 
hampering democratisation and institutional reform in Turkey. Most of the efforts by the 
elected governments to harmonize this asymmetrical relationship and carry out institutional 
reforms were perceived negatively by the establishment of the state, as insidious attempts 
to infiltrate the ‘sanctified’ order of the state. 
This duality was also mimicked in the way the two internal security agencies were perceived, 
partly explaining the alleged problems of division of labour, coordination and jurisdiction 
as noted above. Indeed, in the years preceding the military coup	d’état in 1980, the police 
was highly politicized along left and right wings. Unconfirmed reports suggested that 
police units made up of leftist officers were sent to disperse right-wing demonstrations and 
vice versa. During the mid-to-late 1990s, some sections of the police force again became 
purportedly subject to extreme Turkish nationalist politicisation, especially at the height of 
the conflict with the separatist terrorism of the Kurdish �orkers’ Party (PKK), and for both 
the police and the gendarmerie, claims of human rights abuses were rampant.
However, more recently, with the increased quality of the police training and education, the 
rising numbers of commissioners and officers receiving masters and doctorates (some on 
topics including human rights law, technologically more advanced crime-fighting methods, 
etc.) and the positive impact of EU twinning projects, a younger reformist wing seems to 
have emerged within the police. This wing is also psychologically supported by civil societal 
demands for the establishment of more professional, accountable and transparent police 
structures. However, the durability and strength of this wing highly depends on the political 
will of the government and the state’s sustained pro-EU reform course. Pro-reform circles 
and wings are in dire need of such external support and extra-institutional mechanisms to 
persist and become successful.
In this general context, important formal changes were legislated between 2002 and 2005, 
which may be seen as having an impact on police reform. Among those legal changes, one 
could cite the changes made in the: 
• Turkish Penal Code (TCK) 
• Anti-Terror Law (TMK)
• The Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK and later, CMK)
• The Law on Associations
• The Law on Assembly and Demonstration Marches
• The Code of Civil Procedure
• The Law on Police Duties and Powers (PVSK)
• The Law on the Trial of Civil Servants
• The Judicial Records’ Law
• The Law on Military Courts 
• The Execution of Sentences and Security Measures Act -(CGIK) (The Law 
pertinent to implementation of punishment and security precautions)
However impressive these legal changes may be and notwithstanding their potential links 
with police reform, they can hardly be seen as amounting to a comprehensive and holistic 
approach to police reform for several reasons:
Firstly, most of the legal changes espoused in EU Harmonization Packages signify steps to 
fortify the role of the judiciary and merely to expand the formal space for individual rights 
and liberties vis-à-vis the security forces, without associated institutional and administrative 
measures that could support a more substantive and sustainable change. The amendment to 
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK)30 aptly illustrates the disjointed relation between formal 
legal changes and institutional/administrative and mentality-oriented transformation. 
3.3. 
Legal Changes and 
Associated Challenges 
Fostering an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform in the Mediterranean: 
Learning from Turkish and Palestinian Police Reform Experiences
10
66 January 2008
The amendment has introduced a more “prosecutorial” or “inquisitorial” orientation in 
conducting criminal procedures, armed prosecutors with considerably more powers and 
made the police subject to their permission in the issuance of search and arrest warrants, 
among other limitations. However, while the decreased powers of the police ideally 
constituted a positive step towards the protection of individual rights and liberties, in actual 
practice – as also noted by numerous high-level police officers and NGO and human rights 
organization professionals – this change meant an increased strain between the judges/
prosecutors and the internal security agencies, thus creating a confusion over authority.31 
Secondly, although those changes officially involved the establishment of “judiciary 
police” structures (adli	kolluk) or specialized police units to help prosecution processes, 
institutional arrangements to support such formations considerably lagged behind. Instead, 
police and gendarmerie agencies remained in a passive/demanding situation with regard 
to the empowered prosecutors. Additionally, many prosecutors also failed to fulfil the 
promises entailed in legal changes partly due to the lack of adequate training/adaptation 
structures that would normally support formal changes. Indeed, contradictory decisions 
by numerous prosecutors over similar or comparable situations created more confusion. 
Obviously, prosecutors’ empowered situation should also be contextualized within their 
already dubious locus within judiciary processes which are reportedly laden with claims of 
politicization, corruption and lack of professional and educational capacities. 
Coupled with the above-mentioned strain, this situation may have led police and 
gendarmeries agencies to espouse a ‘passive-aggressive’ or ‘passively resistant’ attitude 
vis-à-vis formal changes which, according to them, unjustly undercut their previous 
powers. This passively resistant attitude, coupled with media frenzy over “crime rates 
spiralling out of control” especially in large metropolitan centres like Istanbul and Ankara, 
led institutional demands and social discourses over the need for “re-securitization”.32
Numerous police and gendarmerie officers and bureaucrats have uttered claims that “increasing” 
crime rates had to do with an undue stress over prosecutors’ supremacy and a priority over 
human rights protection that purportedly disempowered the abilities and capacities of the 
police and gendarmerie agencies which shy away from using initiatives due to fear of legal and 
institutional reprisals. This feeling reportedly lends support to anti-reform tendencies especially 
within older, more status quo-oriented ranks and circles of the police and gendarmerie agencies. 
Younger and more educated, yet lower level ranks -while maintaining their critical attitude 
especially towards its partial course- have continued to support reforms.33
Among the major challenges waiting to be tackled are the problems of over-centralization of 
the Turkish provincial and public administrative system which make reform attempts difficult 
to implement. The conflicts between older, more status-quo oriented upper cadres and 
younger, more educated and more reform minded lower cadres also emerge as important 
problems. Moreover, the weaknesses of the social services designed for, and socio-economic 
rights of the police and gendarmerie personnel remain major obstacles for reform.34 
However, the EC’s actual policies and practices in Turkey in the area of SSR in general and 
police reform in particular could be seen rather as amounting to an incremental approach 
marked by a fragmented and partial course. �hile one could still claim that the EC’s policies 
have had a generally positive impact that could further be developed and improved in time, in 
terms of police reform, those policies have remained rather disparate to fulfil their promises. 
This situation may have resulted from the EU’s recent tendency towards “re-securitization”.
The general EU policies towards Turkey in the area of “Justice, Freedom and Security” appear 
stronger on issues related with Europe-wide security (including visa policies, protection of 
borders, fight against crime, drugs and others), partly due to EU priorities as a united space 
of security. Indeed, reportedly because of 11 September 2001, Europe-wide terrorist attacks, 
and its increasingly anti-immigrant “tilt”, most EU policies have been “re-securitized”, 
causing concern among international NGO, human rights and academic circles,35 all of which 
may partly explain the EC’s “security-oriented” priorities in relation to Turkey.
Illustrative EC initiated and partially-funded projects in Turkey include: 
• Strengthening the fight against organised crime, money laundering, financial 
sources of crime and the financing of terrorism, human trafficking; 
• Establishing a “National Drugs Monitoring Centre” and developing and 
implementing a “National Drugs Strategy”; 
3.4.
Is the EU-wide
“Security-Orientation” 
Taking the Front Seat?
30 Turkey	2005	Progress	Report	prepared and issued 
by the European Commission sees the amendment in 
a rather positive light: 
“The adoption of a new Code of Criminal Procedure 
represents a major step forward. It introduces the 
concept of cross examination of witnesses during tri-
als, which did not previously exist in the Turkish legal 
system. The Code establishes the concept of plea bar-
gaining. In order to reduce the number of unmeritori-
ous prosecutions, the Code increases the discretion of 
prosecutors, who are now able to assess the strength 
of the evidence before preparing an indictment. More-
over, judges are given the power to return incomplete 
indictments. Under the new Code, criminal investiga-
tions must be carried out by a judicial police force 
under the authority of the public prosecutor. The Chief 
Public Prosecutor will be responsible for preparing an-
nual evaluation reports on the judicial police under his 
command. The Code introduces the requirement that 
certain trials are to be recorded on audio and video 
tape. Judges and prosecutors throughout Turkey have 
received training on the Code. However, implementa-
tion of the powers to discontinue unmeritorious cases 
and the operation of the judicial police will need to 
be assessed”. European Commission, Turkey	 2005	
Progress	Report, Document Nº COM (2005) 561 final, 
Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 15.
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• Strengthening the capacity for the interdiction of drugs in rural areas; 
• Developing an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s integrated border management 
strategy and a training system for Border Police; 
• Supporting visa policy and practice;
• Developing an Action Plan to implement Turkey’s asylum and migration strategy, 
and an Asylum and Country of Origin Information (COI) System.36
Despite the apparent uses and successes of these projects, especially in terms of technical 
and professional capacity-building for the Turkish police and gendarmerie, EU-wide security 
orientation may be said to have been used as an alibi by the security establishment to 
press for authoritarian amendments to the previously liberalized laws. Indeed, as the 
reform climate and the government’s zeal for reform receded, and under renewed terrorist 
attacks by the separatist PKK since 2005, the most positive changes started to be reversed. 
In June 2006, the Anti-Terror Law (TMK) was amended along authoritarian lines. In June 
2007, the Law on Police Duties and Powers (PVSK) was amended to increase the authority 
of the police and gendarmerie agencies at the expense of judicial oversight mechanisms 
and citizens’ rights and liberties.37 Following these amendments, reported cases of 
infringement of citizens’ rights and liberties as well as the police’s excessive use of force 
significantly increased. As long as Turkey is seen by the EU as mainly a “gateway” country 
to stop unwanted illegal immigrants, drugs and terrorists, then such “re-securitization” 
orientations will be hard to challenge.  
Some EC projects associated with the area of “Justice, Freedom and Security” have been 
considerably helpful in initiating somewhat shy yet potentially promising steps towards 
police reform in Turkey. Those projects furthered the agenda for institutional reform to 
support professionalization, accountability and transparency of the police agencies. 
Among these are projects to support: 
• Civilian Oversight of the Internal Security Sector; 
• Training of Gendarmerie Officers on European Human Rights Standards; 
• Ethics for the Prevention of Corruption; 
• An Independent Police Complaint Commission and Complaints System for the 
Turkish National Police and Gendarmerie; 
• Enhancement of the professionalism of the Turkish Gendarmerie in its Law 
Enforcement Activities; 
• Strengthening the Accountability, Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Turkish 
National Police; 
• Improvement of Statement Taking Methods and Statement Taking Rooms; 
• Strengthening Police Forensic Capacity.38
 
According to high and mid-level police professionals and international and local experts, 
these projects have been particularly useful in building professional capacities and 
supporting human-rights sensitivities among the cadres of the police and the gendarmerie 
(see Table 1). Most of these projects, however, are still in their beginning stages and their 
effectiveness in deepening professionalization down to the critical mass of the police and 
gendarmerie officers would have to be tested in time. There has been considerable success 
in helping increase “reform-mindedness” among younger and more educated cadres.
 
EU-orientation emerges as the main force behind attempts to reform Turkey’s security sector 
as a whole, and for police reform in particular. �ithout the country’s EU accession process, 
police reform would certainly be in jeopardy. However, due to the partial and disparate 
character of the EU’s policy towards Turkey’s reform process, police reform attempts 
have remained weak. Developments since 11 September 2001 have generally worked to 
strengthen “securitization” as a general tendency both at a global scale and at the level 
of the EU. Because of this “security-first” orientation, the EU’s SSR policies in Turkey, 
3.5. 
Professionalization, 
Accountability and 
Transparency on the 
Move
3.6. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
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including police reform, have been negatively impacted. The feeble political will in Turkey 
to reform the security sector agencies creates additional problems for reform attempts. 
To be successful, a more holistic approach to SSR (including police reform) is needed, by 
taking into consideration the connections between police reform and judiciary reform, 
institutional and personnel reform. Finally, a strong local “ownership” and political will for 
reform is required in Turkey to make the transformations sustainable and create synergies 
and multiplier effects. The EU and the Turkish government should seek partnerships with 
NGOs and the media to follow through a substantive police reform, as part of security 
sector reform.
Despite the initial success and potential promises of the EC-assisted projects, one should 
not overlook the remaining problems and challenges associated with EU policies towards 
police reform in Turkey. Obviously, solutions to some of those problems are beyond the 
ability of the EU since they would require consistent involvement by the Turkish government 
and police and gendarmerie agencies. However, some other problems could be solved if 
the EU alters some of the parameters towards police reform in Turkey in particular, and in 
accession countries in general. 
Conclusion 1: Police reform policies seem to lack an effective parliamentary and civil society 
component. Most EU policies are customized directly for the executive and its associated 
branches, namely the Ministry of Interior, Turkish National Police and the Gendarmerie. 
However, in virtually all EU Member States, the national parliaments play important roles 
in the democratic and civilian oversight of the security sector, including internal security via 
the police and gendarmerie. 
Policy Recommendation 1: The EU should assist in empowering the Plenary and the 
Special Commissions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) which are currently 
particularly weak and under-equipped to deal with police reform or oversight-related 
issues, and are under heavy influence and bearing of an overpowered executive. This also 
creates a problem of top-down reform motion within the Ministry of Interior, National Police 
department and the Gendarmerie.
Conclusion 2: The civil society component is even more limited with regard to monitoring 
and overseeing police agencies, the protection of human rights and pressing for increased 
professionalization. The impact of both the executive and the parliament also seem to be 
limited in terms of their civilian oversight and control abilities especially regarding the 
gendarmerie, which retains its military nature. 
Policy Recommendation 2: �hile EU clout may be limited in these spheres, it could still have 
an important contribution if it develops new policies to support civilian capacity-building 
(perhaps in partnership with other organizations such as the UNDP). The formation of an 
Independent Police and Gendarmerie Monitoring Board made up of NGO representatives, 
lawyers, parliamentarians and Ministry of Interior personnel could be anticipated, which 
could also strengthen the human rights dimension of existing EC projects that remain tilted 
towards security concerns.
Conclusion 3: �hile the EC also assists in Judicial Reform through a few promising projects 
(see Table 2), police reform oriented steps usually have remained unconnected to them.39 
The problem of police and gendarmerie agencies remaining in a passive/demanding 
situation with regard to the empowered prosecutors without associated institutional 
measures are one of the main challenges to police reform. 
Policy Recommendation 3: The disjointed courses of judicial and police reforms should 
be synchronized and synergies could be sought between the two. Joint projects bringing 
together judiciary and police and gendarmerie professionals could be envisioned. 
Conclusion 4: Similar to the problem of the disjointed judicial and police reforms, an 
important challenge for police reform is the fragmented and uneven nature of structural/
institutional, personnel and legal reform. Both structural/institutional and personnel 
reform attempts significantly lag behind. 
Policy Recommendation 4: The EU could consider working more closely with the Turkish 
government and parliament to design more coherent policies of an institutional/structural 
nature as well as personnel reform in the police sector in Turkey. EU could help the Turkish 
government increase the socio-economic rights of the police and gendarmerie personnel. 
This would also help fight anti-reform tendencies within the government, police and 
gendarmerie.
31 This point was referred to at the        Turkey	2006	Progress	
Report	prepared and issued by the European Commission: 
“A number of cases have shown inconsistency in the 
judiciary approach to the interpretation of legislation. 
As regards the implementation of the new Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the establishment of the judicial 
police has led to some tensions between the police 
and gendarmerie bodies and prosecutors. Despite the 
Ministries of Interior and Justice issuing two circulars, 
prosecutors report difficulties in effective supervision 
of the judicial police”. European Commission, Turkey	
2006	Progress	Report, Document Nº COM (2006) 649 
final, Brussels, 8 November 2006, p. 9. 
32 For an overview of this media frenzy as well as the            
social discourse over the need for “re-securitization,” 
see Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey, 
“Istanbul’da Korku Nöbeti (Fear Seizure in Istanbul)”, 
Istanbul:	 Kent	 Kültürü	Dergisi, Journal of Urban Cul-
ture, May 2007.
33 These views are based on interviews conducted for         
this report.  
34 Interview with a provincial governor, spring 2007.        
35 For various discussions, see Sergio Carrera and Thi-        
erry Balzacq, The	EU	fight	against	Terrorism:	Security	
Problems,	 Insecure	Solutions, CEPS Policy Brief,  Nº 
80, July 2005, p. 1; “Changes in the Security Concept 
and JHA Agenda,” CEPS in collaboration with IUEE 
Universidad Autonóma de Barcelona, http://www.
libertysecurity.org/article293.html (retrieved 9 Febru-
ary 2006); Tony Bunyan, “�hile Europe Sleeps: Under 
the ‘�ar on Terrorism’ a Veneer of Democracy is Legiti-
mating the Creation of a Coercive (and Surveillance) 
State”, ECLN	 Essays, Nº 11, December 2005, http://
www.ecln.org/essays/essay-11.pdf; Open	 Letter	 from	
Civil	Society	Groups	to	the	European	Parliament	Call-
ing	 on	 MEPs, 6 December 2005, http://www.state-
watch.org/news/2005/dec/ep-let-dat-ret.htm.
36 EC Delegation to Turkey, Projects in the area of Jus-          
tice, Freedom and Security and Political Criteria, Man-
aged by Section C, Fields of Assistance, TR 0204.05; 
TR 0204.04; TR0304.03; TR 0204.03; TR0601.06; TR 
0204.01; TR 0404.05; TR 0304.04; TR 0204.02; TR 
06.01.01; TR 0304.02; TR 0601.07.
37 For various discussions, see documents associated       
with TESEV-CEPS project on “Recasting a Vital Bal-
ance in Difficult Times: How to Increase the Visibility 
in Turkey of the new European Values and Processes of 
Security and Human rights?”. See http://www.tesev.
org.tr/etkinlik/tr_ab_insanhaklari.php.
38 EC Delegation to Turkey, Projects in the area of          
Justice, Freedom and Security and Political Criteria, 
Managed by Section C, Fields of Assistance, TR 06 01 
03; TR0601.08; TR0501.05; TR0404.03; TR 0301.01; 
TR0201.01; TR0304.01. 
39 The Judicial Modernization and Penal Reform;       
Development of Probation Services; Establishment 
of Courts of Appeal; Better Access to Justice; Good 
Governance, Protection and Justice for Children; 
Court Management System; Training of lawyers on 
the European Convention on Human Rights; Training 
Programme on the Istanbul Protocol: Enhancing the 
Knowledge Level of Non-Forensic Expert Physicians, 
Judges and Prosecutors. EC Delegation to Turkey, 
Projects in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security 
and Political Criteria, Managed by Section C, Fields 
of Assistance, TR 0404.02; TR 0401.02; TR 0501.01; 
TR0601.04; TR0501.04; TR0501.03.
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Conclusion 5: The EU lacks significant benchmarks to evaluate the success of police reform 
in Turkey and in other candidate countries. Partly due to the unconnected and somewhat 
inconsistent course of reform attempts, the EU aims to assist police reform in a rather 
piecemeal manner and fails to connect this to the larger issue of security sector reform. 
Even in its monitoring and evaluation functions, issues related to SSR in general and police 
reform in particular are dealt with at different sections of successive Turkey Progress 
Reports, thus creating more confusion and incoherence. 
Policy Recommendation 5: The EU should consider adopting clearer benchmarks to 
evaluate progress and assist transformation in SSR and police reform. These benchmarks 
could help provide a clearer, objective monitoring of the advances as well as challenges 
involved in police reform attempts, including: 
• Status and substantive content of the laws directly or indirectly related to police reform;
• Status and substantive content of the administrative orders and practices related 
to police reform;
• Level of professionalization among the police and gendarmerie corps; 
• Level of professional education among the police and gendarmerie corps, 
especially at the level of human rights education;
• Existence, or lack of, professional code of ethics for the police and gendarmerie corps;
• Level of complaints by the citizens against the police and gendarmerie corps, 
and the pace with which those complaints have been resolved administratively 
or by the courts;
• Existence, or lack of, executive, parliamentary and judiciary mechanisms of 
control and oversight of the police and gendarmerie corps;
• Existence, or lack of, civil societal / NGO mechanisms of control and oversight of 
the police and gendarmerie corps;
• Finally, existence and strength of local “ownership” (government, parliament, 
ministries, security agencies, NGOs, civil society groups and media) as an 
important component that should be tackled both as part of the overall reform 
attempt, and as a benchmark to follow.
Fostering an EU Strategy for Security Sector Reform in the Mediterranean: 
Learning from Turkish and Palestinian Police Reform Experiences
14
66 January 2008
3.7. 
Annex – Selected 
European Commission 
Twinning Projects 
TABLE 1
Police Reform in Turkey
Title Purpose Results and Outputs
Improvement 
of Statement-
Taking Methods 
and Statement-
Taking Rooms in 
the Republic of 
Turkey
To improve and place 
statement-taking activities 
in the process of judicial 
investigations in the context 
of a shift towards evidence-
based prosecutions.
To strengthen cooperation and 
coordination regarding judicial 
investigations between law 
enforcement institutions.
- Existing statement-taking methods of the Turkish National Police assessed and 
improved in terms of respect for the rule of law and human rights; statement-
taking capacity enhanced.
- Standards on pre-service and in-service training and curriculum regarding 
statement-taking and law enforcement staff statement-taking developed and 
adopted by the Turkish National Police.
- Police staff (200 trainers and 800 police officers) adequately trained and 
equipped to take statements as well as to correctly evaluate evidence collected 
in the investigation process so as to be able to utilize the knowledge derived 
from evidence during statement-taking.
- Standards concerning physical conditions of statement-taking rooms developed 
and adopted by the Turkish National Police; pilot statement-taking rooms (30 in 
total) equipped with appropriate means meeting those standards.
- Current cooperation and coordination between police, prosecutors and lawyers 
in the process of judicial investigations assessed and institutions’ cooperation 
capabilities improved through the establishment of a Joint �orking Group.
Civilian 
Oversight 
of Internal 
Security Sector
To establish framework 
conditions for Governors, 
District Governors and 
Ministry of Interior staff to 
make the transition from 
a narrowly conceived, 
bureaucratically and 
legalistically managed 
oversight of policing to a 
system of security sector 
governance based on a 
human-centred understanding 
of security and public 
safety and transparency in 
partnership with civil society. 
- Legislative framework developed to enable the Ministry of Interior and public 
administrators (governors and sub-governors) to exercise effective civilian 
oversight over law enforcement bodies.
- Ministry of Interior and public administrators (governors and sub-governors) 
have access to conceptual and institutional resources to oversee policing 
effectively.
- Civil society and the media have the conceptual and institutional tools to 
engage with policing oversight.
- Ministry of Interior and the Grand National Assembly establish a working 
framework to ensure transparency of internal policing services through the 
standing committees on Internal Affairs and Planning Budget Commissions of 
the parliament.
Strengthening 
Accountability, 
Efficiency and 
Effectiveness 
of the Turkish 
National Police.
Development and 
implementation of a 
Corporate Plan for the 
reorganization of the service, 
including modern training 
and personnel systems for 
the Turkish National Police 
in line with current EU 
practices with a view to adopt 
recommendations from the EU 
with respect to the working 
conditions and procedures of 
police personnel.
- Corporate Plan for the reorganization of the service endorsed.
- Proposals for the reorganization of community police facilities adopted and 
initiated.
- Detailed project proposals and technical specifications elaborated for the above.
- Operational standards for policing communities endorsed.
- Programme for pre-service, in-service and management of human resources 
development and training for the Turkish National Police agreed upon and 
implemented.
- Proposals for a new personnel system including appraisal, promotion and 
appointment endorsed and installed.
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Title Purpose Results and Outputs
Development of 
Probation Services 
in Turkey 
To establish a modern probation 
service in Turkey with a view to 
assisting the judiciary and public 
prosecutors in the implementation 
of the judicial supervision of 
offenders.
- Current legislation, regulation reviewed and redrafted as necessary.
- National standards and probation service methodologies drafted.
- A first generation Risk and Needs Assessment (RNA) tool developed.
- A new case record and data collection system created.
- Pilot model probation units established in Ankara (national) and other 
cities (local: Kocaeli, Kütahya, Denizli Nevşehir) and the operation of 
these pilot projects were reviewed.
- Training curriculum prepared and training by Short Time Experts from 
Member States delivered.
Support to the 
Establishment of 
Courts of Appeal in 
Turkey
To establish functioning Courts of 
Appeal in Turkey under the new 
Turkish legislation by creating and 
carrying out training programmes 
for forthcoming judges, 
prosecutors and auxiliary staff.
Not	delivered	yet,	but	the	following	results	are	expected:
- Judges and prosecutors appointed to the Courts of Appeal trained on 
the role of Courts of Appeal in a legal system.
- Judges and prosecutors appointed to the Courts of Appeal capable of 
effectively dealing with procedures and working methods in the Courts 
of Appeal under the acquis. 
- Judges and prosecutors appointed to the Courts of Appeal provided with 
necessary tools to tackle legal and practical questions which will arise 
when working in the Courts of Appeal and applying the new regulation.
- Case law in the procedure and in the working methods in all new 
established Courts of Appeal unified from the first day they start 
functioning.
- A basis and mechanisms for future contacts and collaboration with 
similar courts in EU Member States (including study visits) established 
in order to improve, develop and create solutions within the system.
- The auxiliary staff appointed to the Courts of Appeal prepared to 
handle their somewhat new duties and responsibilities in the Courts of 
Appeal.
- Judges and prosecutors of the Court of Cassation trained, with the 
function of the Court of Cassation in a legal system with second instance 
courts.
Better Access to 
Justice
To promote access to justice in 
Turkey by developing legal aid 
systems to ensure that citizens 
enjoy rapid and easy access to 
justice through technological 
opportunities and alternative 
disagreement solutions.
Not	started	yet,	but	the	following	results	are	expected: 
- Increased utilization of the present legal aid system.
- Introduction of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) into the Turkish 
legal practice.
- Improvement of fairness in criminal proceedings.
- Strengthening the technical capacity of the Ministry of Justice.
Support to Court 
Management 
System in Turkey
To reconstruct the court 
management system (case 
flow, fiscal, human resources, 
court performance standards 
and technology management), 
thus to strengthen an effective 
judiciary and to accelerate judicial 
processes.   
No	results	yet,	but	the	following	results	are	expected: 
- Develop and implement new court management system including 
fiscal, case flow and human resources, and the management of courts.
- Reduce backlog of cases from previous years.
- Shorten the average trial duration.
- Raise professional skilfulness of the auxiliary personnel in pilot courts, 
and especially enhance the effectiveness and responsibility of the 
administrative staff.
- Obtain effective technological solutions and technology management 
system for a more satisfactory and rapid judiciary system.
TABLE 2
Judiciary Reform in Turkey
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The EU has not been able to develop a comprehensive SSR strategy towards its eastern 
and southern neighbours. Across North Africa and throughout the Middle East, the EU 
has chosen to enhance security, rather than pursue democratic apertures. The Palestinian 
case is the most acute example of a contradictory EU policy to endorse and then reject 
elections. As member of the international Quartet to the Middle East peace process (with 
the US, UN and Russia), the EU has backed the three conditions demanded by Israel prior 
to engaging in negotiations with the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Resulting from 
Hamas’ unwillingness to explicitly 1) recognize Israel, 2) renounce violence, and 3) accept 
all previous agreements, the two ESDP civilian missions in the Palestinian territories were 
suspended: EUPOL-COPPS is not operating to its full capacity and EUBAM-Rafah is not 
operating effectively at the border crossing.40 
After monitoring and declaring the Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006 as free 
and fair, the EU adopted the US/Israeli policy of ostracizing Hamas and supporting the 
PA Presidency. Resulting from the Mecca Accord and Saudi mediation in February-March 
2007, the Palestinians managed to forge a National Unity Government, which crumbled 
as the Presidential Guard deployed at crossing around the Gaza Strip instigating the pre-
emptive Hamas take-over in mid-June 2007. President Abbas moved to create an emergency 
government and to amend the Basic Law, also considered the temporary Palestinian 
constitution. Beyond the constitutional crisis, the separation of security forces between 
an isolated Hamas in the Gaza Strip and an internationally endorsed Fatah in the �est 
Bank causes severe challenges for a unified Palestinian security sector, not to mention the 
feasibility of a single putative Palestinian state.
As a core instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, the suspension of 
the two ESDP civilian missions implies that the EU has moved from a gradualist long-term 
“reformist” SSR plan to adopting the short-term US-Israeli “restructurist” policy, which 
aims to buttress Fatah forces loyal to the PA President, in order to overwhelm Hamas. Not 
only did this policy back-fire when Hamas took over Gaza, but it could also prove equally 
detrimental for subsequent EU security efforts throughout the Middle East. This section 
addresses what the EU and US approaches have achieved in the Palestinian security sector 
and recommends including a reverse disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
process, as well as judiciary reform to foster a more comprehensive European strategy. 
Ultimately, for successful and durable reform to occur, the EU will need to reconsider its 
policy towards the Palestinians. 
EU efforts to reform the Palestinian police emanate largely from the Oslo Accords (1993) and 
its Declaration of Principles, which call for the establishment of a substantial police force 
to sustain the PA. The Palestinian civil police were to be trained, monitored and guided by 
the “deployment of international police observers.” The Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994) 
stipulated a Temporary International Presence (TIP) of 400 members in eight designated 
towns and cities subject to full PA control in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The TIP Protocol stated 
that staff “shall have no military or police function” and would “assist in the organization and 
training of the Palestinian Police.” However, due to political discrepancies between police 
observer missions and peacekeeping executive forces, the TIP negotiations collapsed and 
failed to deploy an international team to assist in reforming the Palestinian police.41
European efforts also emanate from other subsequent international initiatives in the 
Palestinian territories, such as the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) in 
1994, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) “study to identify possible 
reform programs to support the PA Civil Police” in 2004, and the EU Coordinating Office 
for Palestinian Police Support (EUCOPPS) established in 2005. Initial EUCOPPS objectives 
included “both immediate operational elements, in particular the delivery of technical 
equipment, as well as longer-term transformation of the Palestinian police forces, such 
as the reform of management structures and the development of proper accountability 
mechanisms”.42 Together with the PA Ministry of Interior, EUCOPPS prepared the Palestinian 
Civil Police Development Programme (PCPDP), which “serves as both a blueprint [for the 2005-
2008 “transformational and operational plans”] and as a framework for donor assistance”.43 
The resulting EUPOL-COPPS began a three-year mandate on 1 January 2006, but was 
immediately confronted with Hamas’ democratic victory in the legislative elections on 27 
January 2006. The ensuing international financial boycott of the Hamas-led PA not only 
seriously discredited democracy in the Middle East, but is also in violation of donor standards 
for security sector reform assistance and in violation of principles of good governance.44 
On an operational level, the boycott also meant EUPOL-COPPS activities were seriously 
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Territories: 
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impeded and reduced to sporadic stationary deliveries to the Jericho Police Academy, also 
devoid of training activity. International ostracism and Israel Defence Forces (IDF) attacks 
prompted an armed branch related to Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committee, to carry 
out a militant operation at the Kerem Shalom crossing on 25 June 2006, in which two 
Israeli soldiers were killed and another kidnapped. Israel closed the Rafah crossing and 
bombarded the Gaza Strip. Since then, the activities of the other EU civilian mission, on 
border assistance management (EUBAM-Rafah), have also been largely suspended. 
As the EU struggles to define a common foreign policy, the paralysis of the two ESDP civilian 
missions in the Palestinian territories and European acquiescence to help advance the US-
Israeli “restructurist” agenda, rather than maintain its gradualist and long-term “reformist” 
approach to the Palestinian security sector, have depleted the initial neutrality both missions 
enjoyed, which may have reverberating effects on the legitimacy of other EU missions in 
the Middle East.45 The EU has also failed to denounce the Israeli destruction of Palestinian 
infrastructure that had been built with EU funds, such as the Rafah airport. And the IDF often 
targeted PA police facilities, such as police stations and prisons, which were easier to locate 
than Palestinian militias.46 Not only have other EU civil police projects been sidelined, but the 
EU is now perceived by the Palestinians as an implementing instrument for US foreign policy. 
Similar to Afghanistan, where the EU sent some 160 civil officers in June 2007 to train the Afghan 
police force within the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) framework,47 EUPOL-COPPS is 
attempting to train a Palestinian police force within the US-Israeli military agenda. Similar to 
Afghanistan where the EUPOL civilian mission is building on a previous German police reform 
program, so it is in the Palestinian territories, where EUPOL-COPPS builds on a British police 
reform initiative. Both cases depict how the EU provides “soft” power support to the “hard” US 
military lead. The complementary role of the Europeans has led to contradictions in EU foreign 
policy. The European	Security	Strategy (December 2003), for instance, linked security as a 
development precondition to democratic governance. After observing the Palestinian elections 
in January 2007 and then agreeing to overwhelm Hamas demonstrates that the “EU has not yet 
developed an explicit democracy promotion strategy”, and highlights “the apparent double 
standards that exist when �estern states favour ‘stable’ regimes in the region, even if these 
are undemocratic, over ‘unstable’ but potentially more democratic regimes”.48 The Palestinian 
case is an acute example of this contradictory EU policy in the Middle East. 
In the aftermath of the Hamas election, the international community imposed a boycott 
to circumvent the Islamic movement. Endorsed by the US, approved by Israel, and 
implemented by the EU, the Europeans created the Temporary International Mechanism 
(TIM), which operationally replaced the PA Ministry of Finance since the summer of 2006: 
all foreign funds are transferred via the TIM, instead of going to the Single Treasury Fund 
of the PA. Despite resuming funds to the PA emergency government, the US also opened a 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) account: Qatar quickly provided $22 million, Saudi 
Arabia sent $50 million, and Norway $10 million.49 Resurrecting the PLO will undoubtedly 
have reverberating effects on the institutional stability of the PA and on the possibility of 
restoring the National Unity Government.
The US however continues to provide exclusive support to the PA Presidency. Most of the 
$59.8 million approved in early April 2007 by the US Congress were directed to transform 
and strengthen the Fatah Presidential Guard, via the US Security Coordinator (USSC). $16 
million were intended to upgrade and “bolster security” at Karni crossing; $43 million to 
training and equipment for Abbas’ Presidential Guard ($14.5 million of which to “basic and 
advanced training”, $23 million to “non-lethal equipment”, and $2.9 million to “upgrade 
the guard’s facilities”).50 At the end of May 2007, Israel also agreed to permit the training 
of the Presidential Guard near Jericho and training to “reach battalion size formations” also 
began in Egypt, but apparently these battalions will not operate as consolidated units in 
the Palestinian territories.51
Contrary to the US, as of spring 2007, the EU was unable to provide basic funds to its civilian 
mission activities, such as prison reconstruction, court refurbishment, vehicle maintenance, 
and radio repair, which are essential to any basic security sector reform. Lacking the financial 
and political support to implement long-term police reform measures, the two ESDP civilian 
missions have increasingly followed US initiatives in the Palestinian security sector.52 For 
instance, the US training of 5-6 battalions in the �est Bank may lead to the emergence of a 
“green” military force. Under US security supervision and Israeli intelligence coordination 
with this Palestinian gendarmerie, a “blue” civil police force may emerge, assisted by EUPOL-
COPPS. The EU has thus moved from its long-term “reformist” plan towards adopting the 
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short-term “restructurist” SSR plan propounded by the US and Israel.53 This change was 
reinforced with the nomination of former NATO SACEUR, Marine General James Jones, after 
Annapolis in November 2007, as the US Special Envoy for Middle East security.
Though synergies between the EU and US also were reinforced on the ground, via the 
liaison officer for the USSC team with EUPOL-COPPS, US-led activities are problematic for 
the Palestinians and Israelis in general: rather than implementing a peace treaty, the US is 
moving to impose a settlement, which may not be conducive to a two-state solution. The 
US-devised “governor scheme” in the �est Bank has drastic implications for the Palestinian 
security sector. The chain of command sidelined the PA Interior Ministry and the municipal 
governors answer to the PA President. The long-term repercussion of the “governor 
scheme” is further fragmentation of the Palestinian territories. As a revealing indication 
of the Palestinian condition, the US “benchmark document” of May 2007 refers to �est 
Bank cities as “clusters”. Like the benchmarks in Iraq, the initial deadlines were missed, 
and further implementation delays are foreseeable. Ensuring security in their respective 
and separate clusters, the governor system would come to resemble the security structure 
in the neighbouring police-state of Egypt. In the absence of a state monopoly of force (and 
a sovereign state), the wider emergence of militarized family clans is predictable, such as 
the Dughmush clan in Gaza, also known as the “Army of Islam”, and other more extremist 
“jihadist” groups may also try to fill the security vacuum in the Palestinian territories.54 
However, just as the complete consolidation of small semi-autonomous family-clan power 
bases is unlikely, so the governor security “clusters” option in the �est Bank is equally 
unfeasible. Securing the �est Bank first by deploying an international force appears to be 
the US plan, which will further isolate the Gaza Strip, and contradicts the two-state solution.55 
Moreover, exclusive US support for the Presidential Guard has not only sidelined PA ministries, 
but also has marginalized other initiatives by local actors, including the discarded 100-day 
plan by the former PA Interior Minister Hani Qawasmi, considered “benign” by EUPOL-
COPPS for focusing on basic civil order measures such as trafficking; the �hite Paper from 
the National Security branch of the Ministry of Interior, which had gained momentum and 
international support prior to January 2006; and Jibril Rajoub’s proposal to Prime Minister 
Ismail Haniyeh at the end of April 2007, also involving a depoliticized security plan.56
Prior to losing Gaza in mid-June 2007, the PA National Security Adviser’s Technical Team for 
Reform (TTR) proposed an ambitious security sector transformation plan, which involved 
down-sizing the cumbersome security forces with payments for the retirement of older 
staff. Substantial funds were to be made available as well for the demobilization of militia 
fighters outside the official PA framework. The proposed DDR plan however continues to 
exclude other Islamic militias, such as Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, or Palestine 
Islamic Jihad’s military wing, Saraya al-Quds. Despite being obvious, only by including all 
militias and factions will comprehensive and durable reform of the security sector take 
place in what remains of Palestine.
Israel did permit the return of previous PLO resistance forces “to police Palestinians and 
further Israeli security interests in exchange for a defined process that would lead to the 
creation of an independent sovereign Palestinian state in the �est Bank and the Gaza Strip 
by 1999”.57 And in the early phases of the Oslo process, overtures were made to recruit both 
Islamic and secular resistant groups into a “politically plural” Palestinian civilian police, 
but as the peace process continued to balk, internal factional obstacles accrued and such 
groups as Hamas and the “new guard” of Fatah were sidelined.58 The Oslo Accords also 
resulted in over-sizing forces loyal to Arafat, with repercussions for the present Palestinian 
security sector. Another persistent problem was Israel’s demand to have the PA security 
forces fight “terrorism” or dissident groups. The request to detain “non-state” actors 
continues, but is contradictory, as Hamas is now an elected “state” actor. Regime change is 
an accurate definition of attempts to overwhelm Hamas.   
Both Hamas and Fatah have embarked on DDR processes: Hamas more forcefully in the 
Gaza Strip with family clans and the PA Presidency forces more tentatively with Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades in the �est Bank.59 However, the exclusion of Hamas and other resistance 
groups from participation in the official Palestinian security sector not only exacerbated 
the Palestinian crisis, as demonstrated by the bloody street battles between the parallel 
paramilitary forces of Fatah-backed Presidential Guard and the Executive Force, led by 
Youssef �ahar, but also led to the brink of civil war and the pre-emptive Hamas take-over 
of Gaza. The imprisonment of Youssef, the brother of the former Hamas-led PA Foreign 
Minister, Mahmoud �ahar, and his subsequent torture during the crackdown on Hamas 
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in the 1990s by Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip is exemplary of the inherent difficulties in 
a theoretical DDR exercise to have the Executive Force join the PA security forces: the 
blood vendetta and factional feud runs deep between Fatah and Hamas. Nonetheless, a 
Palestinian National Guard, comprising the multiple Palestinian factions, is not entirely out 
of the question. This will need strong political mediation towards a viable power-sharing 
formula, which could ultimately provide a positive precedent for reconciliation between 
Islamic and secular movements in the Middle East. 
Contrary to the US and Israeli “coercive approach to DDR”, a more sustainable long-term 
cooperative approach within a wider SSR strategy could be envisioned by the EU to help 
avoid the violent short-term backfire of dissident militias. A valid proposal is to “reorder the 
DDR sequence”, whereby the Palestinian security sector would integrate as much as possible 
both secular and Islamist militias into an official branch, such as the civilian police, through 
a gradual process of demobilizing, disarming and re-training ex-combatants.60 For militia 
integration to occur, first socio-economic and political incentives must be provided to ensure 
the transition from armed resistance fighter to national security member, which would have 
positive consequences for international and Israeli interests in the Middle East.61 However, 
international and Israeli interference have thus far thwarted the emergence of a depoliticized 
and unified Palestinian security sector, which in turn has fuelled internal competition for the 
monopoly of force on the streets in both the �est Bank and the Gaza Strip. Moreover, any 
DDR exercise will prove futile without the assurance of a reanimated peace process or at least 
a durable long-term hudna	(cease-fire) between Palestinians and Israel.62 
The Palestinian case remains an anomaly to the EU position on security sector reform. 
Though aberrant to other cases where more emphasis is placed on democratic oversight 
and good governance,63 the EU does have the ability to build on field programmes. The 
European Commission had launched a judicial reform project, entitled “Empowering the 
Palestinian Judicial System”, with an initial €7 million in 2002-03. The EU has been unable 
to create cohesion between the police and judicial branches. Closer synergies need to be 
implemented for a more comprehensive strategy to security sector reform.
Conclusion 1: The circumvention of Hamas decreased a sustainable and unified PA, pushed 
Hamas closer to Syria and Iran, helped instigate the Hamas take-over of Gaza, created a 
parallel government in the �est Bank, and only aggravated Palestinian suffering and strife. 
The boycott is not only counterproductive to EU neutrality in the Middle East, but also in 
violation of donor standards for SSR assistance.
Policy Recommendations 1: 
• Lift the financial boycott on the Palestinian people to alleviate the humanitarian 
crisis, particularly in Gaza. 
• Open the Rafah crossing with a reinvigorated EUBAM, to also deploy at the 
other crossing points, and explore the possibility of providing security with the 
deployment of an EU Battlegroup, with the consent of all implicated parties. 
• Mediate the reconstitution of the PA National Unity Government, including both 
Fatah and Hamas. Saudi and Egyptian efforts to do so have apparently not been 
sufficient; the EU can play a larger role as both monitor and mediator. 
Conclusion 2: Devoid of state sovereignty, the Palestinian security crisis has created two 
de facto governments led by competing factions, who both claim the legitimate monopoly 
of force; a claim used by both Hamas and Fatah to impose and reinforce control over their 
respective territorial fragments of what remains of Palestine. 
Policy Recommendation 2: 
• Encourage re-institutionalizing the security chain-of-command, via the PA Interior 
Ministry, to include branches in the �est Bank and Gaza.
• Re-order the DDR process to start with integrating militias into a depoliticized 
national security system to diminish the wide gamut of militant groups. 
• Create concrete synergies beyond the conceptual between the police and judicial 
reform to provide oversight and links between detention and prosecution.
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Conclusion 3: The EU is playing a secondary and complementary role to US and Israeli 
activities in the Palestinian security sector, which may have repercussions for police reform 
initiatives throughout the Middle East, including Afghanistan. 
Policy Recommendation 3:
• Increase funding for EUPOL-COPPS projects aimed at reconstructing prisons, maintaining 
vehicles, providing uniforms, refurbishing training facilities, and repairing radios. 
• Establish a mechanism of evaluating, reporting, and denouncing damages caused 
by Israel to EU funded investments in Palestinian security infrastructure, based 
on the concept of conditionality and compensation. 
• Professionalize civil police via intense training programmes based on strict rules 
of conduct with capacity to then deploy and provide high levels of law and order 
in the Palestinian streets. 
• Initiate a public awareness campaign to describe the security sector plans to 
down-size, integrate and retire ex-combatants; to demarcate the responsibility 
of each security branch; and to distribute an official police “code of conduct”, 
highlighting police activities and citizen rights of appeal to judicial oversight. 
Undertaking these initiatives, in conjunction with international support for economic 
development, political accountability and financial transparency, the EU could then 
reinstate calls for good-governance and democratic-oversight. Restoring a viable degree 
of legitimacy in the Middle East, the EU can still fulfil these long-term imperatives for 
sustainable SSR in the Palestinian territories. To proceed effectively though, the EU must 
reconsider its foreign policy towards the Palestinians. 
The EU needs to strengthen its commitment to SSR, including police assistance, in order to 
develop its role as a global player with transformative and normative powers. The two SSR 
concepts from the Commission and the Council mentioned in this report, and the subsequent 
policy framework, are positive steps forward, but the impact of these documents remains 
limited to small circles of experts within European institutions. The Commission and Council 
should therefore make efforts to ensure that the main recommendations made in these 
documents are incorporated into the workings of the various facets of the EU’s external 
action in accordance with the actions of its main external partners, including the guidelines 
of the 2007 OECD-DAC Handbook	 on	Security	 System	Reform:	 Supporting	Security	 and	
Justice.	In this respect, EU actions in the Mediterranean should not be an exception to this 
more concerted strategy on SSR.  
Several recommendations on the application of SSR promotion in the Mediterranean were 
developed in the 2006 EuroMeSCo report Drawing	 Lessons	 from	 Turkey’s	 and	 Spain’s	
Security	Sector	Reforms	for	the	Mediterranean (Nº 52), which highlighted that SSR can be 
promoted successfully in a framework characterised by: (1) broader locally-driven political 
reform attempts to achieve higher democratisation and human rights standards; and (2) 
a security paradigm shift towards a situation where the needs and rights of citizens take 
priority over those of the state and/or regime. �ithin this context, for the sake of pursuing 
democratic apertures, the EU should attempt to create the necessary conditions to reduce 
tensions, and effectively contribute to conflict resolution in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Taking into consideration political, economic and social factors, six major areas for 
action were identified in that report: 
1. Develop conceptual work by mainstreaming concepts such as human security, peace 
culture and the idea of SSR in EU documents and activities while also promoting 
advocacy work between the EU and third countries in the Mediterranean. 
2. Enhance coherence between actors and policies in order to optimise European efforts 
and turn the EU into a credible and reliable partner in international affairs.
3. Elaborate a framework for both positive and negative conditionality adapted to each 
particular context, with specific emphasis on the need to provide concrete and feasible 
incentives for reform. 
5. 
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4. Offer cooperation opportunities even to countries which have not been disposed to 
pursue reform programmes. Opening windows for external cooperation will contribute 
in the mid- to long-term to create conditions for internal demand for SSR.
5. Reconcile the fight against terrorism with democracy promotion and human rights, 
which is also significant when addressing police cooperation between the EU and its 
Mediterranean partners. 
6. Increase transparency and generate more information on SSR-related issues within 
the framework of EU policies towards the Mediterranean region. A dual process of 
public awareness and diplomatic advocacy could be envisioned. 
Several other proposals were elaborated in the 2006 report, in relation to the Democratic 
Civilian Control of Armed Forces (DCCAF), which have direct implications for various EU 
policies in the Mediterranean region, such as the Barcelona Process, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and European Security and Defence Policy. An identical approach 
was adopted and applied to the following sub-sections in which the proposals related to 
the field of police reform are inspired by the conclusions reached in the two case studies 
elaborated in this report: Turkey and the Palestinian territories. 
As the main regional framework for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and given that all 
partners of the Barcelona Process have committed themselves (at least in theory) to 
promoting democracy and respect for human rights at both a national and regional level, 
the EMP could be a suitable framework to promote police reform in the region. However, 
these same partners have committed themselves to “refrain, in accordance with the rules 
of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another 
partner”, as well as recognising that each member can “choose and freely develop its 
own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system”.64 Thus, it is difficult for the 
EU to promote significant change in police matters if the Mediterranean partners do not 
share that same commitment to reform. Despite this major obstacle, there are issues that 
could still be advanced bilaterally in the framework of the Association Agreements while 
maintaining multilateral dialogue and cooperation: 
1. Multilaterally, the EMP could enhance police cooperation programmes. As 
depicted in the report, the Euromed Police Programme does not intend to promote 
police reform, but rather to strengthen cooperation among police bodies around the 
Mediterranean. This kind of programme should continue, be encouraged and even 
enhanced. This may not promote immediate democratic police reform per	se,	but 
could help create conditions to do so in the mid- to long-term. The cadres engaged 
in these initiatives may become more open to cooperation with the EU, both in 
terms of modernising and democratising their respective police structures.  
2.  Bilaterally, the EMP should strengthen dialogue on police issues. This measure is 
particularly relevant for those countries that are less eager to be actively involved in 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. In those cases, the Barcelona Process remains 
the main platform for political dialogue (including police matters) with the EU. 
Consequently, police-related issues (accountability, transparency, fight against torture 
and ill-treatment) should be incorporated on the agendas of the Association Council 
and Association Committee, as well as in the work of the subcommittees on Human 
Rights established between the EU and some EMP countries, like Morocco and Jordan. 
Contrary to the Barcelona Process, the ENP is a strictly bilateral framework in which third 
countries decide whether or not to take up the EU’s offer for cooperation in various fields in 
exchange for internal political and economic reforms, without the prospect of accession to 
the Union. This policy is developed through Country Reports and Action Plans. The former 
provide an assessment of the political and economic situation, including the institutional 
dimension. The Action Plans, on the basis of country reports, are agreed upon formally 
between the EU and the partner, and include an agenda of political dialogue and reform. 
As described in this report, so far most Country Reports and Action Plans have neglected 
the democratising and governance side of SSR, including police-related issues, only 
mentioning aspects such as the fight against terrorism and border control. The governance 
and democratising side of SSR, including police-related issues, should therefore be 
incorporated in ENP documents and goals, via the following steps:
5.1. 
Police Reform and the 
Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP)
5.2. 
Police Reform and the 
European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP)
64	Barcelona	Declaration	adopted	at	the	Euro-Mediter-
ranean	Conference,	Barcelona, 27-28 November 1995.
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1. Provide detailed information. Country Reports should contain a section on the status, 
structure, problems and linkages to civil authority of the security sector, including the 
police. In cooperation with local partners, European Commission delegations could 
centralize collection of this information in order to provide possible solutions and 
subsequently to propose concrete reform programmes (and when applicable adequate 
benchmarks) pending acceptance by the neighbour country. 
2. Offer suitable incentives. A recurring criticism concerning ENP implementation is that 
compared with the enlargement accession process, it falls short of offering appropriate 
incentives to partners to carry out substantial and sensitive reforms. 
• Demarcate and clarify which agencies and Community programmes third countries 
could participate in.65 Though Europol and Eurojust are not open to full membership, 
ENP partners could upgrade their cooperation with these agencies, particularly 
if committed to democratising and creating transparent synergies between their 
police and judicial sectors. 
• Access to CEPOL (European Police College) could be offered to police officers 
belonging to any ENP country in expectation that this measure will contribute to 
creating awareness among police officials of EU standards and best practices in 
police-related matters.66
• Simultaneously, the EU could assure that police-related programmes can be 
and are financed via the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and 
the Governance Facility (currently under design). 
• Emulating the enlargement experience, the EU could offer twinning programmes in 
the police sector, such as certain projects completed and being developed in Turkey. 
Avoiding the shortcomings highlighted in the analysis of the Turkish experience, Turkey 
could inspire the refining and defining of EU areas of action with neighbour countries.
As illustrated in this report, the two ESDP civilian missions in the Palestinian territories have 
not been particularly effective. If future SSR missions launched using ESDP instruments are 
to be deployed in the Mediterranean area (such as possibly in Lebanon or perhaps the 
�estern Sahara), the EU should study carefully the shortcomings observed in relation to 
the border assistance management (EUBAM-Rafah) and the police reform (EUPOL-COPPS) 
missions. To not replicate the precedent set by the two ESDP civilian missions in the 
Palestinian territories, the EU may wish to consider the following three issues: 
1. In the ESDP framework, ensure legitimacy among the local population by adopting a 
less exclusive and politicized approach when identifying relevant local security actors. 
The EU should not undervalue the risks of ostracizing “non-state” militias which 
enjoy democratic representation as popular recognition for their armed resistance. 
Perceived as taking sides for supporting a specific security branch will inevitably 
deplete proclaimed neutrality, and will lead to the loss of legitimacy. The EU must 
reengage the Palestinians with a respectable degree of neutrality to act as an effective 
and legitimate third party.
2. In view of advancing the ideas put forward to develop a cross-pillar SSR strategy, as 
elaborated in the Council and Commission SSR documents and subsequent policy 
framework, the needs arising from the security-development nexus should be 
addressed. This implies the following:
• Demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) exercises should become 
an intrinsic feature of SSR missions, with particular emphasis on the reintegration 
phase, to include concrete incentives such as training courses and job creation. 
Given the developmental nature of some of these measures, the recent cross-pillar 
fact-finding missions by the EU should continue and be strengthened in the future. 
• Due to the regional dimension of contemporary conflicts, country-specific police 
reform should be complemented by integrated border assistance management 
measures. The latter has been developed as an instrument to fight cross-border 
organised crime and terrorist activities and to contribute to regional trade 
promotion, safe freedom of movement and economic growth. 
5.3. 
Police Reform and the 
European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)
65 European Commission,   Communication	 from	 the	
Commission	 to	 the	Council	 and	 the	European	Parlia-
ment	on	the	general	approach	to	enable	ENP	partner	
countries	 to	 participate	 in	 Community	 agencies	 and	
Community	 programmes, Document Nº COM (2006) 
724 final, Brussels, 4 December 2006.
66 For more information on CEPOL’s legal framework,        
functions and activities see http://www.cepol.net/KIM/
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• Both DDR and border assistance will be important, indeed primordial, aspects 
of future security measures and means for  state-building across the Middle 
East. Since European Member States have become more involved militarily in the 
region, namely in peacekeeping missions in Lebanon and Afghanistan, but also 
via bilateral agreements, the EU needs to be wary about deploying subsequent 
ESDP civilian/military missions without the consent of all parties involved. 
Precaution should therefore be urged to not deploy hastily, for instance along 
the Lebanese-Syrian border, where a low-profile German pilot project is engaged 
in assisting the reform of the Lebanese police, because without Syrian consent, 
implementing effective border management will be difficult, in fact unfeasible. 
Moreover, deploying an ESDP mission would further politicize EU engagement 
with possible other negative results, particularly after the Palestinian precedent. 
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This report has attempted to highlight how the EU has adopted discrepant SSR approaches 
when addressing specific police reform initiatives in the Mediterranean region. The 
conclusion derived from the two cases examined is that so far SSR-related actions by the EU 
are characterised by a lack of coherence with regard to normative democratic goals, but also 
by a fundamental lack of political consistency. Though progress has been made with regard 
to advancing SSR coherence, particularly forthcoming from the European Commission and 
the Council of the EU, Member States have maintained diverse SSR approaches toward 
neighbouring countries. 
�ithout being a compare-and-contrast exercise, this report has examined two cases which 
depict the challenges and obstacles in defining a common EU SSR strategy. Turkey is the 
most contested EU accession case, and the Palestinian territories are the most disputed 
case in the Arab Middle East. The Turkish case demonstrates how the carrot of eventual 
EU membership has not been sufficient for police reform as the accession process has 
continued to be postponed. The Palestinian case illustrates how an initial gradualist EU 
long-term SSR process became part of a short-term Israeli-US endeavour to restructure 
security elements loyal to the pro-�estern PA Presidency. 
Exemplary of broader developments across North Africa, in the Middle East and around 
the Mediterranean, the cases presented in this report conclude that synergies between 
the police and judicial sectors need to be forged to reach a more comprehensive strategy 
to SSR. Subsequently, democratic oversight and transparency are also paramount as long 
as electoral results are respected and supported by the international community. And in all 
cases, SSR assistance must be as depoliticized as possible, to include the perspectives of 
opposition political groups for the potential reintegration and disarmament of their militias. 
To advance the capacity of civil police, the EU could adopt a more holistic strategy to SSR, 
and start to include this topic in the Euro-Mediterranean agenda through the framework of 
the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the ESDP. 
6. 
Conclusion
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